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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 920163-CA 
v. : 
JESUS A. SEPULVEDA, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The sole issue presented in this petition for rehearing 
is whether the Court overlooked relevant law in conducting a sua 
sponte plain error analysis of an issue that was raised by 
defendant for the first time on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Jesus A. Sepulveda, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with the intent to 
distribute, a second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1991) (R. 2). After the trial court denied 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence, a jury convicted 
defendant as charged (R. 22, 26-41, 70-74, 131). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of one to 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and imposed various fines 
and fees (R. 150). The court then suspended defendant's sentence 
and imposed a 36-month term of probation (R. 150-51). 
On appeal, this Court affirmed defendant's conviction 
in an opinion issued October 27, 1992. State v. Sepulveda, 198 
Utah Adv. Rep. 69 (Utah App. Oct. 27, 1992) (a copy is attached 
as an addendum). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State does not disagree with the facts stated in 
the Court's opinion, Sepulveda, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 69-70. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court's sua sponte plain error treatment of the 
scope of detention issue is inconsistent with other decisions of 
the Court. Furthermore, the Court's inconsistent application of 
the waiver rule undermines the integrity of appellate review in 
criminal cases and may have serious consequences for federal 
habeas review of Utah appellate court decisions. 
INTRODUCTION 
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court 
has misapplied the law. See Cummins v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 
172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913). The argument portion of this 
brief will demonstrate that the State's petition for rehearing is 
properly before the Court and should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
IN CONDUCTING A SUA SPONTE PLAIN ERROR 
ANALYSIS OF AN ISSUE RAISED BY DEFENDANT FOR 
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, THE COURT 
MISAPPLIED THE LAW OF WAIVER 
In addressing defendant's "scope of detention" 
argument, this Court correctly noted that defendant raised the 
issue for the first time on appeal and did not urge the Court to 
apply a plain error analysis, an exception to the waiver rule. 
Sepulveda, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 71, 72 n.4. Nevertheless, the 
2 
Court conducted a full-blown plain error analysis. Id. at 72-73. 
Although the Court purports to "decline to consider the scope of 
detention issue for the first time on appeal" in light of its 
conclusion that the trial court did not commit plain error, id. 
at 73/ such an approach misapplies the waiver rule. 
It is well settled that Utah appellate courts will not 
consider an issue, even a constitutional one, for the first time 
on appeal. State v, Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 & n.2 (Utah App. 
1992); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991); 
State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 1990). The appellate 
courts recognize two exceptions to that rule: plain error or 
exceptional circumstances. Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922. 
However, the defendant must demonstrate one of the exceptions 
before the appellate court will look past the waiver and address 
the merits of the issue raised for the first time on appeal. See 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 925 ("We conclude that a defendant may 
not assert a constitutional issue for the first time on appeal 
unless he can demonstrate "plain error" or "exceptional 
circumstances."); Webb, 790 P.2d at 78 (refusing to consider 
issue raised for first time on appeal because defendant "has not 
contended that the plain error exception should apply or that any 
special circumstances justify his failure to present this 
particular ground for the motion to suppress to the trial 
court"); State In Interest of M.S., 781 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah 
App. 1989) ("Although reviewing courts will, in the exceptional 
or extraordinary case, overlook a party's failure to raise 
3 
constitutional challenges in the proceedings below, M.S. has not 
persuaded us of the existence of such exceptional circumstances 
in this case."). 
Here, defendant argued neither plain error nor 
exceptional circumstances to avoid the obvious waiver on appeal. 
Nevertheless, the Court addressed the plain error question sua 
sponte. 
In sum, the Court's plain error treatment of the scope 
of detention issue, in the absence of any plain error argument by 
defendant, is contrary to the direction in Archambeau, Webb, and 
M.S. that the defendant must demonstrate an exception to the 
waiver rule. It therefore represents an inconsistent application 
of the waiver rule by this Court. This undermines the integrity 
of the Court's appellate review in criminal cases (i.e., why does 
Sepulveda get the benefit of sua sponte plain error analysis when 
Webb did not, Webb, 790 P.2d at 78). 
Inconsistent application of the waiver rule also has 
serious consequences in federal habeas proceedings. In Coleman 
v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377, 1382-83 (10th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 
110 S. Ct. 1835 (1990), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals made 
clear that the procedural default rule of Wainwriaht v. Svkes, 
433 U.S. 72 (1977), which bars federal habeas review when the 
state courts have declined to review a federal issue due to a 
procedural default (waiver) by the defendant (e.g., failure to 
comply with a state contemporaneous objection rule), does not 
apply when the state waiver rule has not been consistently 
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applied. In short, inconsistent application of the waiver rule 
by this Court invites wholesale federal habeas review of this 
Court's decisions that have disposed of federal questions on the 
basis of waiver. That sort of pervasive review of state court 
decisions is clearly undesirable, in that it undermines the 
state's weighty interest in the finality of criminal judgments. 
See Boaaess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1981) (emphasizing 
that "integrity of the criminal justice system requires a 
finality of judgment that should limit repetitive appeals and 
collateral attacks" once the normal appellate process has 
concluded). 
In sum, the Court should eliminate from its opinion the 
plain error analysis of the scope of detention issue and simply 
decline to address the issue on the grounds that defendant did 
not present it to the trial court and on appeal did not argue 
either the plain error or exceptional circumstance exception to 
the waiver rule. This would bring the decision in line with 
Archambeau, Webb, and M.S. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should grant 
rehearing and modify its opinion to conform with its own waiver 
law. Utah R. App. P. 35(c). 
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The State certifies that this petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /O ^cfev of November, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
IAN DECKER 
istant Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON U 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Milton T. Harmon, Attorney for Appellant, 36 South 
Main Street, P.O. Box 97, Nephi, Utah 84648, this /^"^day of 
November, 1992. 
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The Commission found that Johnson suffered 
incapacity as early as June 26, 1987, and no I 
later than December 1987 because Johnson may I 
have missed work in June or July 1987 and did 
miss work in December 1987 because of his I 
laryngitis. 'The record amply supports these ] 
findings and Johnson fails to show any flaw in I 
the evidence upon which the Commission I 
relied.3 Accordingly, because Johnson did not I 
marshal the evidence in support of the I 
Commission's findings and then demonstrate that I 
those findings were unsupported by substantial I 
evidence, we accept the findings of the I 
Commission as conclusive. Stewart, £31 P.2d at I 
138. 
Johnson also claims that the Commission I 
applied the incorrect statute of limitations to his I 
action. Because he failed to raise this issue I 
before the ALJ or before the Commission, we I 
will not consider it for the first time on review* I 
Meniam v. Board of Review, Z12V.24447,451 I 
(Utah App. 1991); Rekward v. Industrial I 
Comm'n, 755 P.2d 166,168 (Utah App. 1988). 
CONCLUSION 
We accept die findings of die Commission I 
establishing that Johnson's cause of action arose I 
no later than January 1988, and that Johnson I 
failed to fik his claim within the time allowed ] 
by Utah Code Ann. {32-2*48 (1988). We do not 
address Johnson's claim that the Commission I 
applied the improper statute of limitations I 
because he failed to xaise it -before the I 
Commission. I 
Accordingly, we affirm. I 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge I 
I CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge I 
I CONCUR IN RESULT: J 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge ] 
1. This review is distinguishable from both a de novo 
ceview and the "any competent evidence" standard of 
review. Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68. 
2. An appellate court need not, and will not, consider 
any facts not properly cited to or supported by the 
record. Uckerman v. Uncqln Nat'I Life Ins, Co., 588 
P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978). 
3. Nowhere in the record or in Johnson*s brief does 
Johnson question the definition of the term 
"incapacity" as used in Utah Code Ann. {35-2-48 
(1988). In fact, Johnson consistently equates 
incapacity with missed work. We assume, but do not 
decide, that "incapacity" is linked to missed work and 
we decline to extend our analysis to an independent 
Teview of this issue when Johnson has failed to so 
posture his challenge. 
Cite as 
198 Utah Adv. Rep. 69 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
• . 
Jesus A. SEPULVEDA, 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. 920163-CA 
FILED: October 27,1992 
Fourth District, Juab County 
The Honorable George E. Ballif 
ATTORNEYS: 
Milton T. Harmon, Nephi, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Marian Decker, Salt Lake 
•City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme. 
I litis opinion is subject to revision before 
I publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
I Defendant Jesus A. Sepulveda appeals his jury 
I conviction for possession of a controlled 
I substance with intent to distribute, a 
I second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. J58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1992). We 
I affirm. 
I FACTS 
] On January 30, 1990, Officer Paul V. 
I Mangelson stopped a Camaro sports car near 
1 Nephi, Utah after observing the car had an 
] expired registration sticker. Defendant, the 
J driver, was traveling in the company of a 
I woman and a juvenile. All were Hispanic. 
1 Officer Mangelson observed "[t]he interior was 
I quite cluttered up, and it appeared that they'd 
I been living in the car." 
1 Officer Mangelson asked defendant for his 
1 driver's license and Tegistration. Defendant 
I produced an expired California temporary 
I driving permit and had no registration 
I information for the car. Defendant claimed a 
I friend in California loaned him the vehicle for 
I his return trip to Utah when the truck in which 
I he traveled to California broke down. 
I As the conversation continued, Officer 
I Mangelson observed defendant grow nervous 
I and begin to shake. Officer Mangelson inquired 
I whether defendant was carrying "contraband*1 in 
I the car, and defendant responded negatively. 
I Next, Officer Mangelson asked to search the 
I vehicle for guns, alcohol, or drugs, and 
I defendant said, "Go ahead." Officer Mangelson 
I requested defendant and the two passengers to 
exit the car. During a pat-down search, Officer 
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Mangelson discovered in the juvenile's back 
pocket a pipe commonly used for smoking 
marijuana. 
Officer Mangelson asked defendant to open 
the trunk. Defendant stated he had no key to the 
trunk but broke the lock with a screwdriver so 
Officer Mangelson could search the trunk. After 
ascertaining the trunk contained no contraband, 
Officer Mangelson proceeded to the interior of 
the car. He observed that the screws on the back 
of the driver's bucket seat were marred. At 
some point before Officer Mangelson removed 
these screws, the woman passenger identified 
herself to Officer Mangelson as an undercover 
DEA agent. She told Officer Mangelson she was 
certain the car contained narcotics but did not 
know where they were hidden. Officer 
Mangelson removed the screws on the back of 
the front seat, revealing a compartment 
containing cocaine. 
Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine on 
the ground that it was illegally seized. In support 
of his motion to suppress, defendant argued he 
never voluntarily consented to the search of the 
vehicle, and Officer Mangelson had no probable 
cause to search. The trial court denied 
defendant's motion. Defendant was convicted by 
a jury as charged. Despite his arguments below, 
on appeal defendant additionally claims the trial 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
because Officer Mangelson unreasonably 
detained him beyond the scope of the original 
traffic stop. Defendant also argues he gave no 
voluntary consent, and there was no probable 
cause to search the vehicle. 
In examining a denial of a motion to suppress, 
we review the trial court's findings of fact 
"under a 'clearly erroneous' standard" and the 
trial court's "ultimate legal conclusions" based 
on those findings "under a 'correctness' 
standard." State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040,1043 
(Utah App. 1992). 
STANDING. 
As a threshold issue, the State claims 
defendant lacks standing to challenge the search 
of the vehicle. The State argues the trial court 
actually found defendant had no standing.1 In 
any event, we review the trial court's conclusion 
as to whether defendant had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy under a correctness 
standard, affording no deference. See State v. 
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App. 1991). 
Fourth Amendment rights are personal in 
nature and "'may not be vicariously asserted.'" 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,133, 99 S. Ct. 
421, 425 (1978) (quoting Alderman v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S. Ct. 961, 966 
(1969)); accord Taylor, 818 P.2d at 565. 
Therefore, to challenge the propriety of a 
search, a defendant must establish "a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the invaded place." 
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S. Ct. at 430; 
accord State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 1056, 1058 
(Utah App. 1992). Furthermore, "[o|nce the 
defendant has been put on notice that the state 
claims the warrantless search wait constitutional 
because [the defendant] has no expectation of 
privacy in the area searched, then the defendant 
must factually demonstrate . . . standing to 
contest the warrantless search/ State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d880, 887(Utah App), cert 
denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
La determining whether a defendant has shown 
the requisite expectation of privacy in the area 
searched, we employ a two-step test First, we 
examine whether - the defendant: "has 
demonstrated 'a' subjective expectation of 
privacy in the object of the challenged search.'" 
Taylor, 818 P.2d at 565 (quoting United States 
v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 
1989)); accord State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 80 
(Utah App. 1990). Second, we conclude, as a 
matter of law, "whether society is 'willing to 
recognize the individual's expectation of privacy 
as legitimate.9" Taylor, 818 P.2d at 565 (quoting 
Hastamorir, 881 F.2d at 1560); accord Webb, 
790 P.2d at 80. This test does not provide a 
"bright line" standard because "no single factor 
invariably will be determinative" in judging the 
reasonableness of privacy expectations. Rakas, 
439 U.S. at 152, 99 S. a . at 435 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
Utah courts have concluded a defendant must 
have at least permissive, possessory control of 
the car to contest a warrantless automobile 
search. See State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 
126-27 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); State v. 
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 n.6 (Utah App. 
1990); State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194,200 (Utah 
App. 1987) (Greenwood, J:, concurring and 
dissenting). 
In Constantino, police officers stopped the car 
the defendant was driving because one of the 
officers knew the defendant's driver's license 
had been suspended and there was an 
outstanding warrant for. the defendant's 
passenger. See Constantino, 732 P.2d at 125. 
The officers subsequently confirmed this 
information through dispatch. See id. When the 
defendant told the officers the registered owner 
of the car was "a Mr. Groberg," the officers 
impounded die car until they could find a 
licensed driver or contact the owner. Id. An 
inventory search of the car revealed two plastic 
bags of marijuana bearing the defendant's 
fingerprints. See id. at 125-26. The defendant 
moved to suppress the evidence, arguing lack of 
probable cause to stop and search the vehicle. 
See id. at 126. 
The Utah Supreme Court declined to reach the 
defendant's arguments concerning the validity of 
the search, concluding: 
[T]he facts here show no right to 
possession. [The officer's brief 
investigation of defendant revealed that die 
car was registered to a person other than 
defendant. Defendant presented no testimony 
that he had driven the car with the 
permission of the owner or that he had 
borrowed the car under circumstances that 
would imph permissive use. Absent claimed 
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right to possession, he could not assert any 
expectation of privacy in the items seized 
and had no standing to object to the search. 
Id. at 126-27 (emphasis mddtd); accord State v. 
Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah App. 1987) 
i'"Wc agree with the reasoning in State v. 
Constantino, that there must be at least a 
claimed right to possession in the property."), 
aJTd in part and rev'd in part, 794 ?.2d 460 
(Utah 1990). 
In Robinson, a police officer stopped a van in 
which the defendants Towers and Robinson were 
i raveling for driving erratically. See Robinson, 
797 P.2d at 433. Both defendants produced valid 
"California driver's licenses and a registration 
: fisting "Paul Jarred" as the registered owner. Id. 
! Defendant Robinson, riding in the passenger 
•eat, told the officer Mr. Jarred was his 
employer and had permitted them to take the van 
on a two-week vacation. See id. A check with 
police dispatch revealed the van was not 
reported stolen. See id. After observing a 
iiomemade bed, two amall gym bags, and a 
fishing pole in the back of die van, the officers 
decided to conduct a search, ultimately 
discovering marijuana hidden under the bed. See 
id. at 434. The trial court denied the defendants' 
motion to auppraas the drug evidence. See id. 
We stated: 
The defendants* testimony that they were 
fiven permission by the owner to take die 
van on a two-week vacation trip was not 
disputed by die State. We hold that they 
established a possessory interest in the van 
sufficient to give them both a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the entire van 
interior. 
Id. at437n.6. 
In the instant case, Officer Mangelson was the 
bnly witness to testify at the hearing on 
defendant's motion to suppress. Officer 
Mangelson stated dial when he inquired how 
defendant obtained possession of the car, 
defendant responded "the car belonged to a 
friend in California." According to Officer 
Mangelson, defendant said he and his passengers 
had been given permission from a friend to 
drive this car to Utah. Officer Mangelson 
initially noted the interior of die car was 
cluttered, as if defendant and his passengers had 
been living in die car. 
Therefore, at die time of the search, die facts • 
established (1) defendant was driving die car, (2) 
defendant had permission to use the car, and (3) . 
defendant had personal belongings in the car. 
( Following the two-step standard outlined in 
Taylor, we first conclude defendant's statement 
that the car belonged to a friend in California 
who loaned it to defendant demonstrates a 
-subjective expectation of privacy in the car. We 
must next conclude, as a matter of law, whether 
this statement manifests an expectation of 
privacy society is willing to recognize as 
.legitimate. See Taylor, 818 P.2d at 565. 
In the cases summarized above,3 a driver who ' 
has permission to use a vehicle and has personal 
belongings in the car has -a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the car and its 
contents. In contrast to the defendant in 
Constantino, defendant in the present case told 
Officer Mangelson he was driving the car with 
the owner's permission. As in Robinson, 
defendant's statement that he borrowed the car 
he was driving with the owner's permission was 
sufficient to confer "a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the entire [car] interior." Robinson, 
797P.2dat437n.6.s 
Defendant's claim that he had permission to 
drive die Camaro was unrefuted, he had 
personal belongings within the car's interior, 
and Officer Mangelson had no information the 
car was stolen at the time of the search. 
Therefore, we are persuaded defendant 
demonstrated an expectation of privacy sufficient 
to permit him to challenge Officer Mangelson's 
warrantless search of the car. 
SCOPE OF DETENTION 
Defendant, for the first time on appeal, claims 
Officer Mangelson unreasonably detained him 
after the initial traffic stop when Officer 
Mangelson requested to search the car. The 
State responds that we should not consider this 
issue as defendant raises it for the first time on 
appeal. 
A police officer may legally stop a vehicle 
incident to a traffic offense. See Lopez, 831 
P.2d at 1043; State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, 
157-58 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Roth, 827 
P.2d 255, 257 (Utah App. 1992). Defendant 
does not challenge his initial stop, based upon an 
expired registration sticker. However, the length 
and scope of a police officer's detention of a 
vehicle for a traffic violation must be "'strictiy 
tied to and justified by' the circumstances which 
rendered its initiation permissible." State v. 
Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 
S. Ct 1868, 1879 (1968)); accord State v. 
Hansen, 193 Utah Adv. Rep. 27,28 (Utah App. 
1992). 
Utah courts have determined "(a]n officer 
conducting a routine traffic stop may request a 
driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct 
a computer check, and issue a citation." 
Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435; accord Johnson, 805 
P.2d at 763. The officer may also check for 
outstanding warrants "so long as k does not 
significantly extend the period of detention." 
State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 280 
(Utah App. 1992). However, once the occupants 
of the vehicle have satisfied the reasons for the 
initial stop, the officer must permit them to 
proceed. See Lovegren, 829 P.2d at 158. "Any 
further temporary detention for investigative 
questioning after the fulfillment of the purpose 
for the initial traffic stop is justified under the 
fourth amendment only if the detaining officer 
has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal 
activity/ Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435; accord 
Hansen, 193 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28. 
The State correctly asserts that defendant 
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failed to complain about the scope of his 
detention during the suppression proceedings 
below. Although counsel for defendant renewed 
defendant's motion to suppress twice during 
trial, for some unexplained reason counsel ntvtr 
questioned the legality of defendant's detention 
until this appeal. Defendant is represented by the 
same counsel on appeal. Even on appeal, 
counsel's treatment of the issue is cursory ** 
best.4 
A defendant is ordinarily precluded from 
asserting a claim for the first time on appeal 
unless the trial court committed plain error. See 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 ([Utah 
App. 1991). The Utah Supreme Court has 
outlined the guidelines for determining "plain 
error" as follows: 
The first requirement for a finding of plain 
error is that the error be "plain,11 i.e., from 
our examination of the record, we must be 
able to say that it should have been obvious 
to a trial court that it was committing error. 
. . . The second and somewhat interrelated 
requirement for a finding of plain error is 
that the error affect the substantial rights of 
the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful. 
Id. (quoting State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 
(Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct 
62 (19S9)); accord State v. EWfiitz, 835 P3d 
170, 174 (Utah App. 1992); see also State v. 
Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 35 (Utah 
1992) (Appellate courts review claims of plain 
error "because, if the error is obvious, the trial 
court has the opportunity to address the error 
regardless of the fact that it was never brought 
to the court's attention."). 
Therefore, in the present case-, we must first 
determine whether the necessity of addressing 
Officer Mangelson's detention of defendant after 
the traffic stop "should have been obvious" to 
the trial court. 
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor 
the Utah Supreme Court has focused precisely 
upon the issue of whether an officer's request 
for consent to search a vehicle after a routine 
traffic stop is beyond the scope of detention. 
However, two cases from the Utah Court of 
Appeals addressing this issue were decided only 
recently before October 3, 1990, the date of the 
hearing on defendant's motion to suitress, 
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (issued July 18, 1990) 
and Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (issued April 18, 
1990). Moreover, the certiorari petition in 
Marshall was still pending as of the date of the 
suppression hearing. 
In Robinson, a police officer stopped a van for 
a traffic violation. See Robinson, 797 P.2d at 
433. After receiving the driver's valid license 
and registration, learning the defendants had 
borrowed the van with their employer's 
permission to go fishing in Wyoming, 
determining the van had not been reported 
stolen, and issuing a citation, the officer farther 
detained the defendants. See id. Based upon the 
officer's observation of a homemade bed, two 
gym bags, and a fishing pole in the van while 
speaking to the defendants, die officer requested 
and received permission to search the van. See 
id. at 433-34. The officer discovered marijuana 
during the search and arrested the defendants. 
See id. at 434. 
On appeal, the defendants in Robinson claimed 
their continued detention after the officer had 
issued a citation constituted a seizure in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 435. We 
stated the proper inquiry was "'whether the 
officer's action was justified at its inception, and 
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified k in the first 
place.*" Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 
88 S. Ct. at 1878-79). We noted the defendants' 
nervousness, failure to make eye contact with 
the officer, improper clothing and equipment for 
the weather, and failure to produce written 
permission from the owner were insufficient "to 
justify the roadside detention and questioning 
that followed." Id. at 436. We concluded die 
officer's detention of defendants and request to 
search after "the purposes for the initial atop had 
been accomplished" was "a violation of their 
fourth amendment rights." Id. at 437. 
In Marshall, a police officer stopped the car 
the defendant was driving for am equipment 
malfunction. See Marshall, 791 P.2d at 881. In 
response to the officer's request; the defendant 
produced a New York driver's license and a 
California rental contract for the automobile. See 
id. Th6 defendant told the officer he was 
traveling to Denver to ski and would return the 
car to San Diego. See id. at 881-82. The officer 
became suspicious of the defendant's travel 
plans, however, when he noted that the rental 
agreement specified the car would be returned in 
New York in five days. See id. at 882. After 
issuing the defendant a . citation for die 
equipment problem and returning the license and 
rental contract, the officer asked the defendant 
if he had any alcohol, drugs, or firearms. See 
id. When the defendant said he did not, the 
officer asked to "iook inside the vehicle." Id. 
The defendant replied, "'Go ahead." Id* A 
search of the trunk revealed a controlled 
substance. See id. 
On appeal, we applied the same standard set 
forth in Robinson. See id. at 884. We also noted 
there is no "bright-line rule as to the acceptable 
length of a detention because 'common sense 
and ordinary human experience must govern 
over rigid criteria.'" Id. (quoting United States 
v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,685,105 S. Ct 1568, 
1575 (1985)). When reviewing the scope of 
detention, the focus should not be on the length 
alone but on-"whether die police diligently 
pursued a means of investigation that was likely 
to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, 
during which time it was necessary to detain the 
defendant." Id. (quoting Sharpe, 470 UUS. at 
686, 105 S. Ct. at 1575). 
The police officer in Marshall examined the 
defendant's driver's license and rental contract 
and issued a warning citation for a defective turn 
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defendant. See id. However, the officer's further 
detention of the defendant and request to search 
were appropriate because the defendant's 
destination itinerary would have made a 
reasonable officer suspect the defendant was 
involved in illegal activity. See id. Therefore, 
we admitted that, "[although it is a close 0811," 
the officer's questioning and detention of the 
defendant "was justified because he had 
reasonable suspicion to believe [the defendant] 
was engaged in a more serious crime." Id. 
Significantly, all other pertinent opinions 
holding that a request to search a car following 
a traffic stop exceeded the scope of detention 
have been filed subsequent to the October 3, 
1990 hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. 
In Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, a police officer 
pulled the defendants' vehicle over for traffic 
violations. See id. at 156. The officer noticed 
the defendants were wearing sunglasses, and the 
vehicle was cluttered. See id. The officer 
subsequently requested and received permission 
to search the automobile, ultimately discovering 
a controlled substance. Seeid.al 156-57. 
On appeal, the defendants questioned the 
legality of their continued detention "after the 
purpose of the initial traffic stop had been 
fulfilled." Id. at 157. We dismissed Lovegren's 
nervous behavior, the cluttered appearance of 
die car, and the defendants9 bloodshot eyes as 
not indicative of criminal activity. See id. at 
158. We concluded that, because the officer, 
"(wjithout any other indication of criminal 
activity . . . simply made the decision to search 
the car," the officer's "detention of Defendants 
exceeded the scope of die traffic stop." Id. at 
158 and 159. 
In State v. Godma-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah 
App. 1992), a police officer stopped die 
defendants' car because he suspected the driver 
was intoxicated. See id. at 653. After speaking 
with the defendants, die officer was convinced 
both were sober; however, die driver began to 
shake when asked for his license and 
registration. See id. The driver had no license 
but gave the officer a California identification 
card and the vehicle registration. See id. at 654. 
The officer was allowed to search the car, and 
he discovered cocaine in the trunk. See id. 
On appeal, the State claimed the officer had a 
"reasonable suspicion to further detain and 
question" the defendants. Id. We reasoned that 
nervousness and driving "in a less than direct 
route" to a stated destination do not support "a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Id. at 
655. We concluded the officer's "detention and 
questioning of defendants exceeded the scope of 
the stop and was therefore illegal." Id.; see also 
State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699,703 (Utah App. 
1992) (after defendant produced proper 
documentation and officer observed vehicle 
identification numbers on car registration and 
dashboard were consistent, officer's request to 
view vehicle number on car doorpost exceeded 
scope of traffic stop). 
Jin the instant case, Officer Mangelson made a 
valid stop of the car defendant was driving 
because he observed the car's expired 
registration sticker. Officer Mangelson 
approached the car and requested defendant's 
driver's license and vehicle registration. 
Defendant had no registration and produced an 
invalid, temporary California driving permit. At 
this point, Officer Mangelson did not return to 
his patrol car to conduct a computer check, and 
the hearing transcript reveals no reference to his 
issuing any traffic citation to defendant. Instead, 
he appears to have commenced a dialogue with 
others in die car. In response to Officer 
Mangelson's inquiry, defendant's passengers 
said they were defendant's friends but could not 
give a reason why they were coming to Utah. 
Further extending the scope of detention, 
because he observed defendant's nervousness 
and the cluttered appearance of die car, Officer 
Mangelson asked defendant if he was carrying 
contraband. When defendant said he was not, 
Officer Mangelson requested and received 
permission to search the car for guns, alcohol, 
or drugs, ultimately finding cocaine. 
Although neither die United States Supreme 
Court nor die Utah Supreme Court has 
specifically addressed this scope of detention 
issue, our recent opinions reveal a 
well-developed line of authority.5 Under 
Robinson and Marshall, Officer Mangelson's 
detention of defendant and request to search may 
well have been beyond the scope of the original 
traffic stop. However, these opinions had only 
recently been decided and certiorari was Mill 
pending in Marshall. Because the controlling 
case law was still in its infancy at the time of 
the suppression proceedings below, we cannot 
say any error should have been obvious to the 
trial judge. We, therefore, decline to consider 
the scope of detention issue for the first time on 
appeal. 
CONSENT TO SEARCH 
A search conducted without a warrant is a per 
se violation of the Fourth Amendment unless die 
State establishes the existence of at least one of 
"*a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions.** State v. Arroyo, 
796 P.2d 684,687 (Utah 1990) (quoting Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 
507, 514 (1967)). One such exception is 
consent. See State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296,1301 
(Utah App. 1991); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 
460,467 (Utah App. 1991). 
On appeal, defendant contends he did not 
voluntarily consent to Officer Mangelson's 
search of the vehicle. Specifically, defendant 
argues that because he does not speak English 
fluently and was intimidated by the officer, he 
did not voluntarily consent to the search. 
Defendant also argues his consent was tainted by 
the prior illegal detention. 
To determine whether a defendant's consent to 
search was lawfully obtained, we apply a 
two-part test: "'(1) the consent must be 
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voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent must not 
be obtained by police exploitation of the prior 
illegality.'" Carter, 812 P.2d at 467 (quoting 
Robinson, 797 P.2d at 437); accord Arroyo, 796 
P.2d at 688; Godna-Luna, 826 P.2d 1655. 
Whether defendant's consent was voluntary in 
fact "is a fact sensitive issue to be determined by 
examining the totality of the circumstances," 
including "the specific characteristics of the 
accused and the details of the police conduct" 
Carter, 812 P.2d at 467; accord Arroyo, 796 
P.2d at 689; Castner, 825 P.2d at 704. In 
addition, factors indicating a lack of coercion in 
obtaining a defendant's consent are the officer's 
lack "of a claim of authority to search," "the 
absence of an exhibition of force" by die officer, 
the officer's "mere request to search," 
"cooperation" by the defendant, and the officer's 
lack of "deception." Carter, 812 P.2d at 467-68 
(quoting State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 107, 
106 (Utah 1980)). 
The second prong of die test applies only 
when "antecedent police illegality exists." 
Carter, 812 P.2d at 469. We need not consider 
this "attenuation" issue as we have previously 
declined to consider defendant's challenge to the 
•cope of his detention for the first time on 
appeal. Our examination, therefore, focuses 
upon whether defendant's consent was 
"voluntary in fact"-
In the present case, Officer Mangebon was 
the only witness at the hearing on defendant's 
motion to suppress. He stated that defendant 
"spoke mostly English" and "spoke fairly good 
English/ If defendant could not understand, the 
woman passenger would interpret for him, 
"which was very seldom." Officer Mangelson 
testified that when he asked defendant for 
permission to search the car for guns, alcohol, 
or drugs, defendant replied, "Go ahead." 
Furthermore, although defendant apparently had 
no key to the trunk, when Officer Mangelson 
asked defendant to open the trunk, defendant 
"actually broke the lock on the trunk to open it" 
According to the officer, defendant "was that 
intent on showing me that there was nothing 
there." 
In its written decision denying defendant's 
motion to suppress, the trial court found that 
"uncontr[o]verted testimony shows that consent 
was given for the vehicle search and no evidence 
would support a showing of the consent being 
coerced or in any manner otherwise unlawfully 
obtained." 
Based on the record, we are not persuaded the 
trial court erred in determining defendant 
voluntarily consented to a search of the vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, we initially find defendant has 
standing to challenge Officer Mangelson's 
warrantless search of the car. We conclude 
Officer Mangebon lawfully stopped defendant 
incident to a traffic violation and conducted a 
search of the vehicle defendant was driving 
pursuant to defendant's voluntary consent. We 
do not reach defendant's challenge to die legality 
of the scope of his detention as he raises this for 
the first time on appeal. Therefore, we affirm 
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. In its decision denying defendant's motion to 
suppress, the trial court stated: 
The two paramountQ considerations that this 
set of frets give[s] rise to are whether or not 
there was probable cause for the stop of die 
vehicle, and a subsequent search of k. There is 
also an issue fas] to whether or not As defendant 
under the circumstances of this case had any 
standing to object ta die officer searching die 
„ vehicle aside from the probable cause question, 
and lastly whether or not a consent was obtained 
to search die vehicle by the trooper from the 
defendant. 
The Court concludes that the facts in this case 
support the right of the trooper to proceed with a 
search of the vehicle under- att of the above 
issues, 
(Emphasis added.) 
2. We also agree with Judge Greenwood's reasoning 
in DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194. Judge Greenwood found the 
defendant had standing to object to an automobile 
search because the defendant was driving the car, 
possessed keys to the car's ignition and trunk, had 
personal belongings inside the car and trunk, *had 
complete dominion and control over die area searched 
and could exclude all others," and the officer 
understood the defendant had permission lo use the 
car. Id. at 200-01 (Greenwood, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
3* The present case is easily distinguished from eases 
in which the defendants lacked standing because the 
police officers knew, before conducting a search, that 
the vehicles were stolen. See State v. PurceU, 586 
P.2d 441, 442 (Utah 1978); State v. Montayne, 18 
Utah 2d 38, 414 P.2d 958, 95**0, cert denied, 385 
U.S. 939, 87 S. Ct. 305 (1966); see also State v. 
Larocco, 742 P.2d at 92 (court distinguishes between 
cases where search upheld because "k was clearly 
established and not disputed prior to the search that 
defendant did not own or did not have an interest in 
the property searched" and "those where defendant 
asserts ownership of the property or otherwise an 
interest giving rise to a 'legitimate expectation of 
privacy"), 
4. Despite raising the scope of Officer Mangelson's 
detention of defendant for the fust time on appeal, 
counsel for defendant failed to set forth or urge us to 
apply a plain error analysis. Furthermore, counsel 
never even cited extensive controlling authority that 
die appropriate scope of an officer's detention during 
a traffic stop is limited to checking a driver's license 
and vehicle registration, conducting a computer check 
for outstanding warrants, and issuing a citation. See, 
e.g., Johnson, 805 P.2d at 763; Hansen, 193 Utah 
Adv. Rep.at28;Icpez, 831 ¥.24 X \043; Figueroa-
Solorio, 830 P.2d at 280; Lovegren, 829 P.2d at 157-
58, Roth, 827 P.2d at 257; Robinson, 797 P.2d at 
435. Finally, counsel for defendant felled to perceive 
that, because he should have raised the scope of 
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detention issue before the trial xourt, defendant on 
appeal had a potential claim of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel Rather, counsel improperly 
represented defendant again on appeal See Dunn v. 
Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 878 (Utah 1990), Fernandez v. 
Cook, 783 P 2d 547, 550 (Utah 1989) (petitions for 
writ of habeas corpus were meritorious in view of fact 
that attorney who represents defendant at trial and on 
appeal cannot adequately challenge attorney's own 
competence in a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel). 
5* See also United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 
1519-20 (10th Or. 1988) (officer's detention and 
search of automobile after examining driver's license, 
confirming car not stolen, and issuing citation 
exceeded scope of original traffic stop for failure to 
wear seat belt). 
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